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1Double-Auction Mechanisms for
Resource Trading Markets
K. P. Naveen and Rajesh Sundaresan
Abstract—We consider a double-auction mechanism, which
was recently proposed in the context of a mobile data-offloading
market. It is also applicable in a network slicing market.
Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their
traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell networks (link-suppliers).
Link-suppliers experience costs for the additional capacity that
they provide. Users and link-suppliers (collectively referred to
as agents) have their pay-offs and cost functions as private
knowledge. A system-designer decomposes the problem into a
network problem (with surrogate pay-offs and surrogate cost
functions) and agent problems (one per agent). The surrogate
pay-offs and cost functions are modulated by the agents’ bids.
Agents’ payoffs and costs are then determined by the allocations
and prices set by the system designer. Under this design, so
long as the agents do not anticipate the effect of their actions, a
competitive equilibrium exists as a solution to the network and
agent problems, and this equilibrium optimizes the system utility.
However, this design fails when the agents are strategic (price-
anticipating). The presence of strategic supplying agents drives
the system to an undesirable equilibrium with zero participation
resulting in an efficiency loss of 100%. This is in stark contrast
to the setting when link-suppliers are not strategic: the efficiency
loss is at most 34% when the users alone are strategic. The paper
then proposes a Stackelberg game modification with asymmetric
information structures for suppliers and users in order to
alleviate the efficiency loss problem. The system designer first
announces the allocation and payment functions. He then invites
the supplying agents to announce their bids, following which the
users are invited to respond to the suppliers’ bids. The resulting
Stackelberg games’ efficiency losses can be characterized in terms
of the suppliers’ cost functions when the user pay-off functions
are linear. Specifically, when the link-supplier’s cost function is
quadratic, the worst case efficiency loss is 25%. Further, the loss
in efficiency improves for polynomial cost functions of higher
degree.
Index Terms—Network utility maximization, double-auction,
KKT conditions, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider double auction mechanisms motivated by two
examples – mobile data offloading and network slicing-based
virtualization.
Mobile data offloading is an effective way to manage growth
in mobile-data traffic. Traffic meant for the macrocellular
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network can be offloaded to already installed third-party Wi-
Fi or femtocell networks. This provides an alternative means
of network expansion. Wi-Fi access-point operators and fem-
tocell network operators will however expect compensation
for allowing macrocellular network traffic through their ac-
cess points. Technological, security, and preliminary economic
studies for secure and seamless offloading have been discussed
in [2]–[5].
Network slicing [6] is a virtualization technique that allows
many logical networks to run atop shared physical networks.
It allows physical mobile network operators to partition their
network resources and offer them to different users or tenants
(IoT streams, mobile broadband streams, etc.) in return for
suitable compensation. It enables network operators to focus
on their core strength of delivering high-quality network
experiences while the tenants or virtual network operators can
focus more on business, billing, and branding relations.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss double auction mech-
anisms in the context of mobile data offloading. But the
mapping to the context of network slicing will be obvious.
In recent work, Iosifidis et al. [7] proposed a double-auction
mechanism where a set of mobile network operators (buyers
or users in this work) compete for resources from access-
point operators (sellers or links in this work). The pay-offs
of the users and costs of the links are private information to
the respective parties. The mechanism works as follows. A
network manager collects how much each network operator
is willing to pay each access-point operator, scalar signals
on the costs at each access point, and then determines how
much traffic should be offloaded to each access point and
how much each agent will pay or get. The mobile network
operators and the access-point operators then comply. This is
a scenario with an asymmetric information structure where
(a) the broker is not aware of the actual needs and costs of
network and access-point operators, (b) each operator is aware
only of his own needs or costs, and (c) all agents are price-
taking (made precise in the next section). Following Kelly et
al. [8], Iosifidis et al. [7] showed that a taˆtonnement procedure
converges to the system optimal operating point.
Iosifidis et al. [7, p.1635] point out that designing incentive
compatible mechanisms for double-auctions which are weakly
budget balanced (the broker should not end up subsidizing
the mechanism) is ‘notoriously hard’ and has been done only
in certain simplified settings (McAfee auction [9]) or can
be computationally intensive. So [7] took a network utility
maximization approach and left the analysis of the price-
anticipating scenario open [7, Sec VII, p.1646].
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
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21) We first re-derive the result on efficient allocation when
the agents are price-taking, mainly to set up the notation
for the next three results.
2) We then analyze the price-anticipating scenario along
the lines of Johari et al. [10]. When agents are price-
anticipating, they recognize the effect of their bids on
the allocation. The appropriate equilibrium notion is a
Nash equilibrium. The situation in Johari et al. [10],
when mapped to the current offloading setting, would be
one where the access-point operators are not strategic.
The efficiency loss due to price-anticipating mobile
offloading agents is then at most 34%. However, when
the access-point agents (suppliers) are also strategic
and price-anticipating, the equilibrium is one where the
offloading agents prefer not to offload any traffic. The ef-
ficiency loss is then 100%. The main message is that the
earlier proposed double-auction mechanism of [7] works
when agents are price-taking, but fails in the more real
situation when agents are price-anticipating. One must
then look for alternative double-auction mechanisms.
3) We then propose a modified mechanism where the sup-
plying agent bids first and the users bid in response. To
show that the situation is now improved, we characterize
the new efficiency loss in terms of the supplier’s cost
function, when the user pay-off functions are linear.
For instance, for the quadratic link-cost function, the
worst-case efficiency loss (with the worst-case taken
over linear user pay-off functions) is at most 25%.
4) We extend all of the above results to the setting with
multiple links.
From an implementation theory perspective, the Iosifidis
et al. [7] mechanism in the price-taking scenario implements
the social welfare maximization rule under the competitive
equilibrium solution concept with the minimal message dimen-
sion of 1 (scalar signals). The above implementation ignores
strategic behavior of individual agents. It is not possible
to enforce such mechanisms in general because individual
preferences may diverge from social welfare maximization.
This is the price-anticipating scenario. It is anticipated that if
we do not enlarge the signal space dimension there may be
no mechanism, let alone the Iosifidis et al. mechanism, that
can implement the social welfare maximization rule, under
now the Nash equilibrium solution concept. This is why the
price-anticipating scenario with non-strategic link suppliers
suffered from an efficiency loss. What is surprising in our
current setting is the dramatic increase in efficiency loss from
at most 34% (Johari et al. [10]) to 100% (contribution (2)
of this paper). What is promising from our study is that this
efficiency loss can be mitigated by structuring the interaction,
by making the link player lead the interaction (contribution (3)
of this paper). The solution concept is that of a Stackelberg
equilibrium. Efficiency loss drops down to a value that depends
on the supplier’s cost function and is at most 25% for quadratic
costs and linear user pay-offs. This of course raises the
question of what is the minimal signalling dimension in the
price-anticipating scenario that implements the social welfare
maximization rule in the Nash equilibrium solution concept.
This a very interesting question that is beyond the scope
of this work. Our proposed scheme, which structures the
interactions by asking the supplier to lead, reduces efficiency
loss. It would be of utmost interest if this structuring also
reduces the minimum signalling dimension for social welfare
maximization in the Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept.
We refer the reader to [11] for an excellent discussion on the
implementation theory perspective.
The paper is organized into two parts. In Part I we study a
setting with a single link-supplier. Specifically, in Section II,
we discuss the system model and problem definition. In Sec-
tion III, we discuss the price-taking scenario for the single-link
case. In Section IV, we analyze the price-anticipating scenario.
As a positive result, in Section V, we discuss our proposed
mechanism and characterize the worst-case efficiency loss for
linear user pay-offs in terms of the single supplying agent’s
cost function. In Part II (Sections VI to IX) we generalize the
above results to the setting with multiple link-suppliers. To
focus on the flow of key ideas, we have moved all the proofs
to the Appendix. The paper concludes with some remarks in
Section X.
PART I: SINGLE LINK
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a scenario where M users intend to share the
bandwidth of a (single) link of capacity C > 0 owned
by a link-supplier. In the context of mobile-data offloading
[7], users and link-supplier correspond to mobile-network
operators and the single access-point operator (e.g., Wi-Fi,
femtocell), respectively. The mobile-network operators want
to buy a share of the limited bandwidth resource available
at the access point to offload their macrocellular traffic,
while the access point operator is interested in maximizing
his profit. In the double auction terminology [9], users are
synonymous to buyers bidding for a share of a resource while
the link-supplier is the seller. We refer to the users and the
link-supplier collectively as agents. The social planner, the
entity that designs the mechanism (i.e., sets up the rules for
information transfer, allocation, and payments) is referred to
as the network-manager,
Let xm denote the rate requested by user m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ,
and let ym be the rate the link-supplier is willing to al-
locate to user m. Thus, x = (x1, x2, · · · , xM ) and y =
(y1, y2, · · · , yM ) represent the rate-request and rate-allocation
vectors, respectively. Let y =
∑
m ym denote the aggregate-
rate allocated by the link-supplier to all users. For user m,
the benefit of acquiring a rate of xm is represented by a pay-
off function Um(xm); we assume that Um, m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ,
are concave, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable
with finite U ′m(0). Similarly, the cost incurred by the link-
supplier for accepting to serve an aggregate rate of y is given
by V (y), where V is strictly convex, strictly increasing and
continuously differentiable. Thus, the system optimal solution
is the solution to the optimization problem:
SYSTEM
Maximize:
∑
m
Um(xm)− V
(∑
m
ym
)
(1a)
3Subject to:
∑
m
ym ≤ C (1b)
xm ≤ ym ∀m (1c)
xm ≥ 0, ym ≥ 0 ∀m. (1d)
Continuity of the objective function and compactness of
the constraint set imply that an optimal solution xs =
(xs1, x
s
2, · · · , xsM ) and ys = (ys1, ys2, · · · , ysM ) exists. Further,
if Um are strictly concave then (since V is strictly convex) the
solution is unique. Since Um are strictly increasing in xm, an
optimal solution must satisfy xs = ys. Thus, at optimality, the
rate-requests (demand) and the rate-allocations (supply) are
matched although the capacity C may not be fully utilized.
A network-manager, however, cannot solve the formulation
in (1) without the knowledge of user pay-offs and the link-cost
function. Hence, consider the following mechanism proposed
by Iosifidis et al. in [7] for rate allocation. Each user m
submits a bid pm ≥ 0 that denotes the amount he is willing to
pay, while the link-supplier communicates signals βm (m =
1, 2, · · · ,M) that implicitly indicate the amounts of bandwidth
that he is willing to provide; we refer to p := (p1, p2, · · · , pM )
and β := (β1, β2, · · · , βM ) as the bids submitted by the users
and the link-supplier, respectively.
The network-manager is responsible for fixing the prices µm
(m = 1, 2, · · · ,M) and λ that determines the rate allocation.
The prices µ := (µ1, µ2, · · · , µM ) and λ are supposed to be
the optimal dual variables of the following network problem
proposed by Iosifidis et al. in [7]:
NETWORK
Maximize:
∑
m
pm log(xm)−
∑
m
y2m
2βm
(2a)
Subject to:
∑
m
ym ≤ C (2b)
xm ≤ ym ∀m (2c)
xm ≥ 0, ym ≥ 0 ∀m. (2d)
In the NETWORK problem above we choose to use β
instead of a related α that was used in the original formulation
by Iosifidis et al. in [7]; the quantities α and β are related by
βm = 1/αm ∀m. Then each βm is R+-valued, with values on
the positive real line, while each αm is in general R+∪{+∞}-
valued. Moreover, the signals in β are directly proportional to
the amount of bandwidth the link-supplier is willing to share.
For instance, a lower value of βm implies that the bandwidth
shared by the link-supplier with user m is low, and vice versa.
In particular, βm = 0 implies that the link-supplier is unwilling
to share any bandwidth with user m. This will be useful while
interpreting the Nash equilibrium bid-vectors (Theorem 2).
The above NETWORK problem is identical to the SYSTEM
problem but with the true pay-off and cost functions replaced
by surrogate pay-off and cost functions. In the following, we
first review the case when the users and the link-supplier are
price-taking. This means agents assume prices are given and
do not anticipate the effect of their bids on the prices set by
the network-manager. See Definition 1 below of a competitive
equilibrium. We then proceed to study the more-involved
price-anticipating scenario. Here the agents recognize that the
effective price is based on their bids, anticipate the resulting
allocation, payment, and therefore their pay-off, and act ac-
cordingly. The resulting pay-off functions are new functions
of the bids; see Definition 2. Our methodology in Sections III
and IV is similar to Johari et al. [10], but the outcome in the
price-anticipating scenario is dramatically negative due to the
presence of the strategic link-supplier, as we will soon see. We
then propose a remedy via a Stackelberg framework where the
link-supplier is a lead player and the users are followers.
III. PRICE-TAKING SCENARIO
The sequence of exchanges (between the network-manager
and the agents) in the price-taking scenario is as shown in the
box describing the price-taking mechanism (PTM) below.
PRICE-TAKING MECHANISM (PTM)
1) The network manager announces to the agents
how the allocation will be done and the pay-
ments will be fixed, as a function of prices and
agents’ bids.
2) The network-manager then initiates the bidding
process by fixing the prices (µ, λ).
3) The agents accept the prices and respond by
announcing their respective bids, p and β.
4) The network-manager allocates a rate of xm =
pm/µm to user m and receives a payment of
pm. Simultaneously, the link-supplier is asked
to allocate a rate of ym = βm(µm − λ) to user
m; the total payment made to the link-supplier
is
∑
m
βm(µm − λ)2.
The prices set by the network-manager are (µ, λ). The pay-
off to user m, for bidding pm, is given by
Pm
(
pm;µm
)
= Um
(
pm
µm
)
− pm. (3)
Similarly, the pay-off to the link-supplier is given by
PL
(
β; (µ, λ)
)
= −V
(∑
m
βm
(
µm − λ
))
+
∑
m
βm
(
µm − λ
)2
. (4)
Using the above pay-off functions we characterize the
solution as a competitive equilibrium which is defined as
follows (unless mentioned otherwise, we assume that the
agents' bids and the link-supplier's prices are non-negative,
i.e., pm, βm, µm, λ ≥ 0 ∀m; also, we use 0 to denote the
vector of all-zeros of appropriate length):
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium [10], [12]): We say
that (p,β, λ,µ) constitutes a competitive equilibrium if the
following conditions hold:
(C1) Pm(pm;µm) ≥ Pm(pm;µm) ∀pm ≥ 0,∀m
(C2) PL
(
β; (µ, λ)
)
≥ PL
(
β; (µ, λ)
)
∀β ≥ 0
4(C3) Define M =
{
m : µm 6= λ
}
and
Ĉ =
√√√√(∑
m
pm
)( ∑
m∈M
βm
)
. (5)
Then, the following should hold:
(C3-a) For all m,
pm
µm
= βm
(
µm − λ
)
; (6)
(C3-b) For all m ∈M, the equality µm = µ holds, where
µ =
∑
i
pi
/
min
{
C, Ĉ
}
; (7)
(C3-c) Furthermore,
λ = min
0,
(
1−
(
C
Ĉ
)2) ∑
i
pi
C
 . (8)

In the above definition, condition (C1) implies that the users
do not benefit by deviating from their equilibrium bids pm,
when the prices (λ,µ) set by the network-manager are fixed.
Similarly, (C2) implies that the link-supplier has no benefit
in deviating from the equilibrium bid-vector β. Although
(C1) and (C2) result in the optimality of the users' and the
link-supplier's problem of maximizing their respective pay-
offs, these conditions by themselves do not guarantee system-
optimal performance. The conditions in (C3) (essentially de-
rived from the optimality conditions for NETWORK) are
crucial to guarantee that the prices (λ,µ) set by the network-
manager are dual optimal for SYSTEM. Condition (C3) along
with (C1) and (C2) can then be used to show the optimality
of a competitive equilibrium. We summarize this result in the
following theorem; in particular, we first prove the existence
of a competitive equilibrium, and then derive its optimality
property. This theorem is essentially an extension of the result
due to Kelly [13] and Kelly et al. [8] (see also [10] and [12]).
The main difference that warrants an extension is the presence
of the link-supplier as a strategic agent.
Theorem 1: When the agents are price-taking, there exists
a competitive equilibrium, i.e., there exist vectors (p,β, λ,µ)
satisfying (C1), (C2) and (C3). Moreover, given a competitive
equilibrium (p,β, λ,µ), the rate vectors x and y defined as
xm = pm/µm and ym = βm(µm − λ) (∀m) are optimal for
the problem SYSTEM in (1).
Proof: The result can be gleaned from the results in [7]
though it is not explicitly stated. Our proof of Theorem 1 is a
direct one that does not rely on any learning dynamics. Instead,
it is based on Lagrangian techniques. Details are available in
Appendix A.
IV. PRICE-ANTICIPATING SCENARIO
In contrast to the price-taking scenario, agents initiate the
bidding process in the price-anticipating scenario. Specifically,
the sequence of exchanges is as given below.
PRICE-ANTICIPATING MECHANISM (PAM)
1) The network manager first announces to the
agents how the allocation will be done and the
payments will be fixed, as a function of prices
and agents’ bids.
2) Agents then initiate the bidding process by si-
multaneously announcing their bids, denoted p
and β.
3) The network-manager sets prices
(µ(p,β), λ(p,β)) where we have set
µ(p,β) = (µ1(p,β), · · · , µM (p,β)). Note
that the above prices are dual optimal for the
NETWORK problem in (2).
4) The payments and the allocated rates are exactly
as in the price-taking mechanism, but with (µ, λ)
replaced by (µ(p,β), λ(p,β)).
In the following lemma we report the expression for the
prices (λ(p,β),µ(p,β)).
Lemma 1: Given any vector (p,β) of users' and link-
supplier's bids, the prices (λ(p,β),µ(p,β)) set by the
network-manager are given by
λ(p,β) =
 0 if
∑
i
√
piβi ≤ C
f−1p,β(C) otherwise,
(9)
where f−1p,β is the inverse of fp,β defined as
fp,β(t) =
∑
i
 2pi
t+
√
t2 + 4 piβi
 , (10)
and for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M
µm(p,β) =
λ(p,β) +
√
λ(p,β)2 + 4 pmβm
2
. (11)
Proof: See Appendix B-A.
Continuing with the discussion, using the above prices in
(3), the pay-offs to the users in the price-anticipating scenario
can be expressed as follows for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M (for
simplicity, we use λ := λ(p,β)):
Qm(pm,p−m,β) = Um
(
pm
µm(p,β)
)
− pm
=

Um
(√
pmβm
)− pm if ∑
i
√
piβi ≤ C
Um
(
2pm
λ+
√
λ2+4 pmβm
)
− pm otherwise,
(12)
where p−m = (p1, · · · , pm−1, pm+1, · · · , pM ) denotes the
bids of all users other than m, while β is the bid submitted
by the link-supplier. Similarly, for the link-supplier we have
QL(β,p)
=

−V
(∑
m
√
pmβm
)
+
∑
m
pm if
∑
i
√
piβi ≤ C
−V (C) +∑
m
1
βm
(
2pm
λ+
√
λ2+4 pmβm
)2
otherwise.
(13)
5The quantity V (C) in the above expression is due to comple-
mentary slackness conditions which imply∑
m
pm
µm(p,β)
=
∑
m
ym = C whenever λ > 0.
The users and the link-supplier recognize that their bids
affect the prices and the allocation. Acting as rational and
strategic agents, they now anticipate these prices. The appro-
priate notion of an equilibrium in this context is the following.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium): A bid vector (p,β) is a
Nash equilibrium if, for all m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , we have
Qm(pm,p−m,β) ≥ Qm(pm,p−m,β) ∀pm ≥ 0
QL(β,p) ≥ QL(β,p) ∀β ≥ 0.

When
∑
i
√
piβi < C, the link is not fully utilized. In this
case the Lagrange multiplier λ = λ(p,β) = 0. Examination
of (12) and (13) indicates that the payments made by the users
are all passed on to the link-supplier. This may be interpreted
as follows: for a given set of payments, the link-supplier bids
are such that the link is viewed as a costly resource and the
network-manager passes on all his revenue to the link-supplier.
The link-supplier is thus assured of this revenue even if his link
is not fully utilized. If, on the other hand, the link-supplier's
bids are such that
∑
i
√
piβi > C, then λ > 0, and it is clear
from (13) that not all the collected revenue is passed on to the
link-supplier. Indeed, since λ > 0, we have
∑
m
1
βm
 2pm
λ+
√
λ2 + 4 pmβm
2 <∑
m
pm
where the right-hand side is obtained when λ = 0. The actions
of the link-supplier as a strategic agent creates a situation of
conflict and results in the following undesirable equilibrium.
Theorem 2: When the users and the link-supplier are price-
anticipating, the only Nash equilibrium is (po,βo) where
pom = 0 and β
o
m = 0 for all m = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Proof: See Appendix B-B.
Thus, in the price-anticipating setting, efficiency loss is 100%,
which we interpret as a market break-down. Indeed, at βo =
0, the link-supplier is assured an income of
∑
m pm. Given
this guaranteed income, he minimizes his cost by supplying
zero capacity. The resulting equilibrium is one with the lowest
efficiency, and the situation is vastly different from the setting
when the link-supplier is not viewed as an agent [10].
V. PRICE-ANTICIPATION WITH LINK AS LEAD PLAYER
In view of the break-down of the market when both the users
and the link-supplier are simultaneously price anticipating, we
design an alternative scheme that involves an additional stage.
The sequence of exchanges is as follows.
PRICE-ANTICIPATION WITH LINK AS LEADER
(PALL)
1) The network manager first announces to the
agents how the allocation will be done and the
payments will be fixed, as a function of prices
and agents’ bids.
2) The link-supplier then announces his bid-vector
β. This information is made available to all
users.
3) The users then send their bids pβm (m =
1, 2, · · · ,M ). Let pβ = (pβ1 , pβ2 , · · · , pβM ).
4) The network-manager then computes the prices
(µ(pβ,β), λ(pβ,β)) by solving the NET-
WORK problem in (2).
5) The payments and the rates-allocated are exactly
as in the price-taking mechanism, but with (µ, λ)
replaced by (µ(pβ,β), λ(pβ,β)).
The analysis of this mechanism proceeds as follows. Given
a (β,p), the expression for the prices set by the network-
manager are as in Lemma 1. As a result, the expressions for
the users' and the link-supplier's pay-off functions are exactly
as in (12) and (13), respectively, but with p replaced by pβ.
Using these pay-off functions, we characterize the solution in
the form of Stackelberg equilibrium defined next.
Definition 3 (Stackelberg Equilibrium): A bid vector (β,pβ)
is a Stackelberg equilibrium if, for all m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , we
have
Qm(p
β
m,p
β
−m,β) ≥ Qm(pm,pβ−m,β) ∀pm ≥ 0
QL(β,p
β) ≥ QL(β,pβ) ∀β ≥ 0.

Observe that the bid-vector β announced by the link-
supplier in step-2 anticipates the user bids pβ of step-3. For a
given β, the bids submitted by the users is in anticipation of
the prices the network-manager announces in step-4.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that C =∞ so that
the capacity constraint is not binding (the case where C is
finite can be similarly handled). Thus, recalling (9) and (11),
we have λ(p,β) = 0 and µm(p,β) =
√
pm
βm
. As a result the
pay-off functions can be simply expressed as
Qm(pm,p−m,β) = Um
(√
pmβm
)
− pm (14)
QL(β,p) = −V
(∑
m
√
pmβm
)
+
∑
m
pm. (15)
This simplification will enable us to focus on the key ideas
rather than dwell on the technicalities arising from a finite C
(which can be handled but is cumbersome and not enlighten-
ing).
From (14) we see that the user pay-offs are independent of
the bids submitted by the other users. As a result, for a given
β, the unique equilibrium strategy for user-m is given by
pβm = argmax
pm≥0
(
Um
(√
pmβm
)
− pm
)
. (16)
6In Lemma 2 we report the expression for pβm that is obtained
by solving (16).
Lemma 2: For a given β we have
pβm =
{
r2βm
βm
if βm > 0
0 otherwise
(17)
where rβm is the fixed point of U
′
m(r) = 2r/βm.
Proof: Since the objective function in (16) is continuously
differentiable and strictly concave (both are easy to check), it
suffices to show that pβm of (17) solves the following optimality
equation:
U ′m
(√
pmβm
) √βm
2
√
pm
− 1 = 0.
Indeed, with pm = pβm of (17) plugged into the above
expression we have
U ′m(rβm)
βm
2rβm
− 1 = 0
and so rβm satisfies U
′
m(rβm) = 2rβm/βm. The case when
βm = 0 is straightforward.
We extend the definition of rβm in the above lemma by
defining rβm = 0 if βm = 0. It is then easy to see that
rβm =
√
pβmβm is the allocation to user m. Plugging the
above result into (15), we compute the optimal β that the
link-supplier should announce in step-1 as
β∗ ∈ B∗ = argmax
β≥0
{
−V
(∑
m
rβm
)
+
∑
m
r2βm
βm
}
, (18)
where β ≥ 0 means component-wise inequality.
For any β∗ ∈ B∗ it is clear that (β∗,pβ∗) constitutes a
Stackelberg equilibrium, where the rate allocated to user-m is
given by xβ
∗
m = y
β∗
m =
√
pβ
∗
m β∗m = rβ∗m . However, we first
need to assert the existence of a solution β∗, i.e., that the set
B∗ is nonempty.
Theorem 3: Suppose Um(·) and V (·) satisfy the following:
xU ′m(x) → ∞ and V (x)/x → ∞ as x → ∞. Then the set
B∗ is nonempty. Hence, under the above assumptions on the
pay-offs and cost function, a Stackelberg equilibrium exists.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark: The above assumption excludes cost functions that
are asymptotically linear, and pay-offs such as log(1 + x).
However, we note that these assumptions are not too restric-
tive. Also, note that it is not possible to assert the uniqueness
of β∗ as it is not clear how r2βm/βm varies as a function of
βm (although it can be shown that rβm increases with βm).
In the remainder of this section, we restrict attention to
linear user pay-offs.
A. Stackelberg Equilibrium for Linear User Pay-offs
An explicit expression for the Stackelberg equilibrium can
be derived when the user pay-offs are linear. Suppose that the
user pay-offs are of the form Um(xm) = cmxm where cm > 0
(m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ). Without loss of generality, assume that
c1 = maxm{cm}. The Stackelberg equilibrium can then be
computed as follows.
First, fix a β. Recalling Lemma 2, we have
rβm =
βmU
′
m(rβm)
2
=
βmcm
2
so that the equilibrium bid of user-m can be written as
pβm =
r2βm
βm
=
βmc
2
m
4
. (19)
Substituting for rβm in (18), the optimal β
∗ can be computed
by solving
max
β≥0
{
−V
(∑
m
βmcm
2
)
+
∑
m
βmc
2
m
4
}
.
The solution to the above problem is given by
β∗m =
{
2
c1
v−1( c12 ) if m = 1
0 otherwise
(20)
where v(x) = V ′(x). The equilibrium bids of users in
response to this optimized β∗ is then given by
pβ
∗
m =
{
c1
2 v
−1 ( c1
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise. (21)
Thus, when the user pay-offs are linear, the link-supplier
allocates all the bandwidth to the “best” user (i.e., the one
with the maximum slope cm); in return, the best user alone
makes a positive payment to the link-supplier.
The rate allocated to user m at equilibrium is
xβ
∗
m = rβ∗m
=
√
pβ
∗
m β∗m
=
{
v−1
(
c1
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise. (22)
The total rate served by the link-supplier at equilibrium is
given by
∑
m y
β∗
m =
∑
m x
β∗
m = v
−1 ( c1
2
)
.
B. Lower Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Given a Stackelberg equilibrium (β∗,pβ
∗
) the efficiency is
defined as the ratio of the utility at equilibrium (Stackelberg
utility) to the system optimum (social utility):
E({Um};V ) =
∑
m Um
(
xβ
∗
m
)− V (∑m xβ∗m )∑
m Um (x
s
m)− V (
∑
m x
s
m)
(23)
where xsm denotes the social optimum allocation to user m
(obtained by solving SYSTEM in (1)). Note that we have
emphasized the dependency of efficiency on ({Um};V ) by
incorporating these into the notation for efficiency.
When the link-supplier is non-strategic, from Johari et al.
[10] it is known that the bound on efficiency is (4
√
2−5), i.e.,
E({Um}, V ) ≥ (4
√
2 − 5) for any general collection of user
pay-off functions {Um} (the loss in efficiency is thus no more
than 34%). The above bound is obtained in [10] by doing the
following.
(a) Show that the users’ equilibrium bids in the original
game (with general user pay-off functions) constitutes
an equilibrium in an alternate game with appropriately
chosen linear pay-off functions.
7(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Geometric interpretation for the efficiency bound.
(b) Use this to show that the efficiency in the original game is
bounded below by the efficiency achieved in the alternate
game.
(c) Finally, minimize the efficiency over the set of all linear
pay-offs; this can be explicitly computed and is (4
√
2−5).
In our case, although (a) holds1 for any given β, there
is a subtle issue2. Since the link-supplier is also strategic,
the original game and the alternate game (with linear user
pay-offs) may not have identical Stackelberg equilibria. In
particular, the β∗ that optimizes the objective in (18) may
not necessarily optimize
max
β≥0
{
−V
(∑
m
βmam
2
)
+
∑
m
βma
2
m
4
}
, (24)
which is the objective corresponding to the game with linear
pay-offs: Um(xm) = amxm with am = U ′m(rβ∗m). Thus, (a)
and (b) may not hold for general user pay-offs. However, an
analog of (c) continues to hold if we restrict our attention
to the ensemble of all linear user pay-offs. The lower bound
on efficiency will however depend on the link-suppliers cost
function V (x). This result is detailed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Fix a link-cost function V (·). For any set of
linear user pay-offs {Um}, we have
E({Um};V ) ≥ inf
c>0
cv−1( c2 )− V (v−1( c2 ))
cv−1(c)− V (v−1(c)) (25)
where v(·) := V ′(·).
Proof: See Appendix D.
1Formally, we can show that for any given β, the equilibrium strategy pβm
for the users in the original game with pay-off functions {Um} is also an
equilibrium strategy for the users in an alternate game with linear pay-offs
{Um}, where Um(xm) = cmxm with cm = U ′m(rβ∗m ).
2Our conference version [1] missed this subtle point and incorrectly made
a more general claim that the lower bound held for a larger class of user
pay-offs.
C. Efficiency Bound for Linear User Pay-offs and Polynomial
Link-Costs
We apply the above theorem to derive explicit expressions
for the lower bound on the efficiency when the link-cost
function is the polynomial bxn. We start with the simplest
case of quadratic link-cost, i.e., V (x) = bx2 where b > 0. We
then have v(x) = 2bx so that v−1(y) = y2b . Thus, using (25),
we obtain
E({Um};V ) ≥ inf
c>0
c c4b − V ( c4b )
c c2b − V ( c2b )
= inf
c>0
c c4b − b( c4b )2
c c2b − b( c2b )2
= inf
c>0
c2
4b (1− 14 )
c2
2b (1− 12 )
=
3
4
.
Thus, when the link-cost is quadratic, the worst-case efficiency
loss for any linear user pay-off is no more that 25%.
Similarly, suppose V (x) = bx3 for x ≥ 0, with b > 0. (This
is increasing and convex for x ≥ 0.) Then, using the bound
(25) and a similar calculation, we obtain
E({Um};V ) ≥ 5
4
√
2
≥ 0.88.
Thus, the worst-case efficiency loss improves to 12% when
the link-cost is cubic. In general, suppose the link-cost is
polynomial of degree n ≥ 2, i.e., V (x) = bxn, x ≥ 0, b > 0,
then the bound on efficiency is given by
E({Um};V ) ≥
(
1
2
) n
n−1 2n− 1
n− 1 . (26)
The aforementioned lower bound is increasing as a function
of n and converges to 1 as n→∞. Thus, if the link-cost can
be modeled as bxn, the efficiency loss reduces with increase
in n.
8The above observation provides strong support for our
proposed PALL mechanism when compared with the price-
anticipating mechanism of Section IV whose efficiency loss
(for any {Um} including linear user pay-offs and any V ) is
100%.
D. Worst-Case Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Although the class of polynomial link-cost functions yield
favorable lower bounds on efficiency, we now show that there
exists a family of link-cost functions Vn, n ≥ 1, such that
the corresponding sequence of efficiency-bound converges to
0 as n→∞. Thus, the worst-case efficiency bound, over all
possible linear {Um} and over all possible V , is 0.
To see this, let us first rewrite (25) by expressing V in the
integral form V (x) =
∫ x
0
v(τ)dτ to get
E({Um};V ) ≥ inf
c>0
cv−1( c2 )−
∫
v−1( c2 )
0
v(τ)dτ
cv−1(c)−
∫
v−1(c)
0
v(τ)dτ
=: inf
c>0
H(c, v).
For a given c and a marginal cost function for the link-supplier
v(·), H(c, v) can be geometrically interpreted with the aid of
the illustration in Fig.1(a) as follows: the numerator in the
formula for efficiency is the area of the regionA1 (light shaded
region) while the denominator is total area of A1 and A2
(shaded dark). We then have
H(c, v) =
A1
A1 +A2
=
A1/A2
1 +A1/A2
where Ai denotes the area of region Ai (i = 1, 2). In Fig. 1(a)
we have used e1 to denote v−1( c2 ); also, f1 = v
−1(d1) where
d1 is arbitrarily chosen in
(
c
2 , c
)
. Since V is strictly convex
and increasing, it follows that v is strictly increasing.
Now, it is possible to construct a sequence of v(·) functions,
say {vn}, such that en ↓ 0, dn ↓ c2 while fn ↑ v−1(c); an
illustration of such a construction is depicted in Fig. 1(b).
Observe that along such a sequence we have A1 ↓ 0 and
A2 ↑ c2v−1(c) > 0. As a result we have H(c, vn) → 0
as n → ∞. Thus, for any given c it is possible to produce
pathological link-cost functions whose efficiency-bounds are
arbitrarily close to 0. Therefore, it is not possible to guarantee a
less-than-100% efficiency loss (i.e., a positive efficiency) when
the class of all possible link-cost functions are considered.
Nevertheless, bounding the efficiency for a fixed link-cost
function is reassuring.
PART II: MULTIPLE LINKS
VI. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section we extend our results to the more general
setting with multiple links. We assume an example scenario
with parallel links so that the users have the flexibility to off-
load different amounts of rates on different links. Simultane-
ously, the respective link-managers have to be competitive in
terms of their bids in order to maximize their respective pay-
offs3. Although it is natural to expect active participation from
3Extension to a general network as in Kelly [13] is straightforward and
does not bring out any new phenomenon.
both users and link-managers, in the upcoming Theorem 6
we show the contrary. We will see that, when the users and
the link-managers are strategic, the market collapses due to
zero participation from both types of agents. This outcome
is similar to the single-link case. This also establishes that
the break-down in the single-link case is not due to the
monopolistic nature of the supplier in the single-link setting.
In Theorem 6, alternative routes exist, and yet, the undesirable
equilibrium ensues.
We begin by generalizing our notation from Section II.
As before we assume that there are M users in the system.
However, we now generalize our earlier model by introducing
L parallel links. The capacity of link ` = 1, 2, · · · , L is given
by C` > 0. Let xm` denote the rate requested by user m on
link `, and let ym` be the rate the link-manager ` is willing to
allocate to user m. Thus, xm = (xm1, xm2, · · · , xmL) is the
rate-request vector of user m, and y` = (y1`, y2`, · · · , yM`)
is the rate-allocation vector of link `. Let X = (xm : m =
1, 2, · · · ,M) and Y = (y` : ` = 1, 2, · · · , L) denote the rate-
request matrix and rate-allocation matrix, respectively. The
user pay-off and the link-cost functions are given by Um and
V`. As before, we assume that Um and V` are concave and
strictly convex, respectively. In addition, both Um and V` are
strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with U ′m(0)
finite.
The analog of the problem SYSTEM in (1) is given by (in
the sequel, the acronym ML stands for Multi-Link):
ML-SYSTEM
Maximize:
∑
m
Um
(∑
`
xm`
)
−
∑
`
V`
(∑
m
ym`
)
(27a)
Subject to:
∑
m
ym` ≤ C` ∀` (27b)
xm` ≤ ym`, xm` ≥ 0, ym` ≥ 0 ∀m, `. (27c)
Similarly, denoting the users' and the link-managers' bid-
vectors as
pm = (pm1, pm2, · · · , pmL)
β` = (β1`, β2`, · · · , βM`),
respectively, the analog of problem NETWORK in (2) is:
ML-NETWORK
Maximize:
∑
m,`
(
pm` log(xm`)− y
2
m`
2βm`
)
(28a)
Subject to:
∑
m
ym` ≤ C` ∀` (28b)
xm` ≤ ym`, xm` ≥ 0, ym` ≥ 0 ∀m, `. (28c)
We introduce some more notation. Let P = (pm : m =
1, 2, · · · ,M) denote the users' bid matrix. Similarly, the
link-managers' bid matrix is denoted by B = (β` :
` = 1, 2, · · · , L). The network-manager sets prices λ =
(λ1, λ2, · · · , λL) and M = (µm : m = 1, 2, · · · ,M)
where µm = (µm1, µm2, · · · , µmL). The prices λ and M
are essentially the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints (28b) and (28c), respectively.
We investigate the price-taking and the price-anticipating
scenarios separately, as was done in the single-link setting.
9VII. PRICE-TAKING SCENARIO
The mechanism under the price-taking scenario is exactly
as in Section III (see PTM in Section III), except that now
there are multiple link-managers who submit their respective
bids β` (` = 1, 2, · · · , L) simultaneously. In this setting, given
the prices (λ,M) set by the network-manager, the pay-off to
user m can be written as
Pm(pm;µm) = Um
(∑
`
pm`
µm`
)
−
∑
`
pm`. (29)
Similarly, the pay-off to the link-manager ` is given by
PL,`
(
β`; (µ`, λ`)
)
= −V`
(∑
m
βm`
(
µm` − λ`
))
+
∑
m
βm`
(
µm` − λ`
)2
(30)
where µ` := (µ1,`, µ2,`, · · · , µM,`). The following are the
generalizations of Definition 1 and Theorem 1, respectively.
Definition 4 (Competitive Equilibrium): A vector of bids
and prices (P ,B,λ,M) is said to constitute a competitive
equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
(C1) Pm(pm;µm) ≥ Pm(pm;µm) ∀pm ≥ 0,∀m
(C2) PL,`
(
β`; (µ`, λ`)
)
≥ PL,`
(
β`; (µ`, λ`)
)
∀β` ≥ 0,∀`
(C3) For each ` define M` =
{
m : µm` 6= λ`
}
and Ĉ` =√
(
∑
m pm`)
(∑
m∈M` βm`
)
. Then,
(C3-a) pm`µm` = βm`
(
µm` − λ`
)
∀(m, `);
(C3-b) µm` = µ(`) where
µ(`) =
∑
i
pi`
/
min
{
C`, Ĉ`
}
∀`,∀m ∈M;
(C3-c) λ` = min
{
0,
(
1−
(
C`
Ĉ`
)2) ∑
i
pi`
C`
}
∀`.

Theorem 5: When the users and the link-managers are
price-taking, there exists a competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
given a competitive equilibrium (P,B,λ,M), the rate ma-
trices X and Y, defined as xm` = pm`/µm` and ym` =
βm`
(
µm` − λ`
)
∀(m, `), are optimal for the problem ML-
SYSTEM in (27).
Proof: The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward
extension of the proof of Theorem 1.
VIII. PRICE-ANTICIPATING SCENARIO
Recall that when the users and the link-managers are price-
anticipating they expect that the bids submitted by them
affect the prices set by the network-manager. In particular,
the users and the link-managers are aware that the prices
(λ(P,B),M(P,B)) set by the network-manager, in response
to the bids (P,B) submitted by the agents, are dual-optimal
for the problem ML-NETWORK in (28). The details of
the mechanism under price-anticipating scenario is similar
to PAM in Section IV, except that the setting now consists
of multiple link-managers who submit their respective bids
simultaneously.
Now, the expressions for the prices set by the network-
manager is as reported in the following lemma (which is in-
line with the result in Lemma 1).
Lemma 3: Given any matrix (P,B) of users' and link-
managers' bids, the prices (λ(P,B),M(P,B)) set by the
network-manager are given by, ∀(`,m)
λ`(P,B) =
{
0 if
∑
i
√
pi`βi` ≤ C`
f−1` (C`) otherwise,
where f−1` denotes the inverse of the function f` which is
defined as
f`(t) =
∑
i
 2pi`
t+
√
t2 + 4 pi`βi`
 ,
and
µm`(P,A) =
λ`(P,A) +
√
λ`(P,A)2 + 4 pm`βm`
2
.
Proof: Omitted since it is a straightforward extension of
the proof of Lemma 1.
The pay-off to the users in the price-anticipating scenario
can thus be expressed as
Qm(pm,p−m,B) = Um
(∑
`
pm`
µm`(P,B)
)
−
∑
`
pm`. (31)
It is possible to simplify the above expression by substituting
for µm`(P,B). We then obtain an expression that is a general-
ization of the pay-off function in (12) (note that Qm(·) in (12)
is for L = 1). However, we now need to consider 2L sub-cases
depending on whether
∑
i
√
pi`βi` ≤ C` or otherwise, for each
` = 1, 2, · · · , L. For instance, for L = 2 there are 4 possible
sub-cases. Suppose
∑
i
√
pi1βi1 ≤ C1 and
∑
i
√
pi2βi2 > C2.
Then, denoting λ2 := λ2(P,A), we have
Qm(pm,p−m,B)
= Um
√pm1βm1 + 2pm2
λ2 +
√
λ22 + 4
pm2
βm2
− 2∑
`=1
pm`.
The expression for the links' pay-off function, however,
comprises only two sub-cases as in (13):
QL,`(β`,β−`,P)
=

−V`
(∑
m
√
pm`βm`
)
+
∑
m
pm` if
∑
i
√
pi`βi` ≤ C`
−V`(C`) +
∑
m
1
βm`
(
2pm`
λ`+
√
λ2`+4
pm`
βm`
)2
otherwise
(32)
where λ` := λ`(A,P). Using the above pay-off functions,
the definition of Nash equilibrium in Definition 2 can be
analogously extended to bid vectors (P,B) in the multiple-
link setting.
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Finally, in the following theorem we report the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Po,Bo), which is
inefficient in the sense that the market is non-functional at
(Po,Bo) with users making zero payments (i.e., pm` = 0) and
the link-managers providing zero rate (i.e., βm` = 0).
Theorem 6: When the users and the link-managers are
price-anticipating, the only Nash equilibrium is (Po,Bo) where
pom` = 0 and β
o
m` = 0 ∀m, `.
Proof: See Appendix E.
IX. PRICE-ANTICIPATION WITH LINKS AS LEAD PLAYERS
We begin as in Section V. The network-manager announces
the allocation procedure and the payment determination func-
tion. The link-suppliers then choose their bid-vectors β` (` =
1, 2, · · · , L). Following this the users choose their bid-vectors
pBm (m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ) where B = (β` : ` = 1, 2, · · · , L)
denotes the link-bid matrix. Let PB denote the user bid-
matrix. The mechanism under this scenario is exactly as
detailed under PALL in Section V, except that now there are
multiple link-managers who announce their respective bids
β` simultaneously in Step-2. We then have the following
generalization of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Stackelberg Equilibrium): A bid matrix
(B,PB) is said to constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium for
the game G({Um}, {V`}) if, for all m = 1, 2, · · · ,M and
` = 1, 2, · · · , L, we have
Qm(pBm,p
B
−m,B) ≥ Qm(pm,pB−m,B) ∀pm ≥ 0
QL,`(β`,β−`,P
B) ≥ QL,`(β`,β−`,PB) ∀β ≥ 0
where B = [β` β−`] is the bid matrix that results when link
` unilaterally deviates from β` to β`. 
Again, as in Section V, for simplicity we relax the capacity
constraint by assuming that C` = ∞ for all ` = 1, 2, · · · , L.
We then have, for all m and `
Qm(pm,p−m,B) = Um
(∑
`
√
pm`βm`
)
−
∑
`
pm` (33)
QL,`(β`,β−`,P) = −V`
(∑
m
√
pm`βm`
)
+
∑
m
pm`. (34)
From (33) we see that the pay-off of user-m is completely
decoupled from p−m, the pay-off of other users. As a result,
given B, the equilibrium strategy of user-m can be simply
expressed as
pBm = argmax
pm
(
Um
(∑
`
√
pm`βm`
)
−
∑
`
pm`
)
. (35)
The following lemma is then a generalization Lemma 2.
Lemma 4: For a given B we have, for all (m, `)
pBm` =

βm`rm(B)2
(
∑
k βmk)
2 if
∑
k βmk > 0
0 otherwise,
(36)
where rm(B) = rm(β`,β−`) is the solution to the equation
U ′m(r) = 2r/ (
∑
k βmk).
Proof: The optimality equation for the problem in (35) is
given by
U ′m
(∑
k
√
pmkβmk
) √
βm`
2
√
pm`
− 1 = 0 if βm` > 0
pm` = 0 if βm` = 0.
It is easy to check that pBm` in (36) satisfies the above
conditions, thus verifying first part of the lemma. For the
second part, note that
∑
k βmk = 0 implies βm` = 0 for
all ` (since βm` are non-negative). Thus, the problem in (35)
reduces to pBm = argmaxpm (−
∑
` pm`), the (non-negative)
solution to which is simply given by pBm` = 0 for all `.
Substituting for PB in (34), the link pay-off functions can
be expressed as
S`(β`,β−`) := QL,`(β`,β−`,P
B)
= −V`
(∑
m
√
pBm`βm`
)
+
∑
m
pBm`
= −V`
(∑
m
βm`rm(β`,β−`)∑
k βmk
)
+
∑
m
βm`rm(β`,β−`)
2
(
∑
k βmk)
2
(37)
for ` = 1, 2, · · · , L. We denote the game played by the links
alone with the above pay-off functions as GL({Um}, {V`}),
while the Stackelberg game played by all agents is denoted
G({Um}, {V`}).
Definition 6: B∗ = [β∗` β
∗
−`] is said to constitute a Nash
equilibrium for the game GL({Um}, {V`}) if
S`(β
∗
` ,β
∗
−`) ≥ S`(β`,β∗−`).
for all β` ≥ 0 and ` = 1, 2, · · · , L. 
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 5: If B∗ is a Nash equilibrium for the game
GL({Um}, {V`}) then (B∗,PB
∗
) is a Stackelberg equilibrium
for the game G({Um}, {V`}).
Unlike the single-link case (recall Lemma 3), existence
of a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game G({Um}, {V`})
under general user pay-offs is still open. This is because
existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for the game
GL({Um}, {V`}) is still open4.
In the special case of linear user pay-offs, Um(xm) =
cmxm, the pay-off functions in (37) for the game
GL({Um}, {V`}) get decoupled from the actions of other
players. The analysis is greatly simplified and one can assert
that a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium exists for the game
GL({Um}, {V`}), and by Lemma 5, a corresponding Stack-
elberg equilibrium in the sense of Definition 5 exists. The
next few subsections are dedicated to showing existence of
the Stackelberg equilibrium for linear user pay-offs, lower
bounding of the resulting the efficiency, and evaluating the
worst-case efficiency. These generalise the results in Part I to
the case of multiple links with linear user pay-offs.
4Tian [14, Th. 3.1] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for
existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in games with compact action
spaces. We have not been able to verify whether Tian’s condition holds for
the game GL({Um}, {V`}).
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A. Existence of Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Case of Linear
User Pay-offs
Consider linear pay-off functions {Um}, where Um(xm) =
cmxm with am > 0. Now, given a bid matrix B = [β`, β−`],
using Lemma 36 we can write
rm(B) =
(
∑
k βmk)U
′
m(rm(B))
2
=
(
∑
k βmk) cm
2
. (38)
Substituting the above in (37) simplifies the link pay-off
functions:
S`(β`,β−`) = −V`
(∑
m
βm`cm
2
)
+
∑
m
βm`c
2
m
4
Thus, when the pay-offs are linear, the pay-off of link-manager
` depends solely on the action β` = (βm` : m = 1, · · · ,M)
chosen by him. Thus, for B∗ = [β∗` , β
∗
−`] to be a Nash
equilibrium the following should hold:
β∗` ∈ argmax
β`≥0
{
−V`
(∑
m
βm`cm
2
)
+
∑
m
βm`c
2
m
4
}
. (39)
for all ` = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Without loss of generality, assume that c1 = maxm{cm}.
Then, the solution to the above problem is given by
β∗m` =
{
2
cm
v−1`
(
cm
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise,
(40)
for all (m, `), where v`(x) := V ′` (x). Substituting for β
∗
m` in
(36) yields
pB
∗
m` =
{
cm
2 v
−1
`
(
cm
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise.
(41)
Thus, the rate allocated to user m on link-` at equilibrium is
given by
xB
∗
m` =
√
pB
∗
m`β
B∗
m`
=
{
v−1`
(
cm
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise.
(42)
Further, recalling (38), the total rate allocated to user m at
equilibrium can be written as∑
`
xB
∗
m` =
∑
`
√
pB
∗
m`β
B∗
m`
= rm(B∗)
=

∑
` v
−1
`
(
cm
2
)
if m = 1
0 otherwise.
(43)
Similarly, the total rate served by the link-manager ` at
equilibrium is given by∑
m
yB
∗
m` =
∑
m
√
pB
∗
m`β
B∗
m` = v
−1
`
(c1
2
)
(44)
The foregoing establishes that a Stackelberg equilibrium exists
for the game G({Um}, {V`}) where the Um are linear pay-offs.
B. Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
As in Part I we define the efficiency of a Stackelberg
equilibrium (B∗,PB
∗
) as
E({Um}; {V`}) =∑
m Um
(∑
` x
B∗
m`
)−∑` V` (∑m xB∗m`)∑
m Um (
∑
` x
s
m`)− V (
∑
m x
s
m`)
(45)
where {xB∗m`} denotes the rates allocated at Stackelberg equi-
librium while xsm` are the social optimum rates (obtained by
solving ML-SYSTEM in (27)).
The following result is a generalization of Theorem 4.
Theorem 7: Fix a collection of link-cost functions {V`(·)}.
For any set of linear user pay-offs {Um}, we have
E({Um}; {V`}) ≥ inf
c>0
∑
`
(
cv−1` (
c
2 )− V`(v−1` ( c2 ))
)
∑
`
(
cv−1` (c)− V`(v−1` (c))
) (46)
where v`(·) := V ′` (·) for ` = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Proof: See Appendix F.
In the next two subsections, we examine how low this
efficiency can sink for polynomial link costs and for general
link costs, under linear user pay-offs. As before, we have an
optimistic result for polynomial link costs.
C. Efficiency Bound for Polynomial Link Costs
Applying Theorem 7 to polynomial link-cost functions, we
obtain results analogous to those in Section V-C. For instance,
suppose all the link-cost functions are quadratic, i.e., V`(x) =
b`x
2 where b` > 0 for ` = 1, 2, · · · , L. In this case we have,
v`(x) = 2b`x so that v−1` (y) =
y
2b`
. Thus, the bound on
efficiency can be written as
E({Um}; {V`}) ≥ inf
c>0
∑
`
(
c c4b` − V`( c4b` )
)
∑
`
(
c c2b` − V`( c2b` )
)
= inf
c>0
∑
`
(
c c4b` − b`( c4b` )2
)
∑
`
(
c c2b` − b`( c2b` )2
)
= inf
c>0
∑
`
c2
4b`
(1− 14 )∑
`
c2
2b`
(1− 12 )
=
3
4
.
The above bound is identical to that obtained for the single
link case in Part I.
Similarly, the bound on efficiency when the link costs are
cubic (i.e., V`(x) = b`x3) is E({Um}; {V`}) ≥ 54√2 . In
general, for polynomial link costs of the form V`(x) = b`xn
(n ≥ 2) we have
E({Um}; {V`}) ≥
(
1
2
) n
n−1 2n− 1
n− 1 .
which converges to 1 as n→∞. Thus, even in the multi-link
setting, the efficiency approaches 1 when link cost functions
bxn are considered and n→∞.
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D. Worst-Case Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Again, as in Part I, the worst-case bound on efficiency can
be arbitrarily close to 0 for pathological link-cost functions.
To see this, assume that V` = V for all `. Then, the bound on
efficiency reduces to that in the single link case, i.e.,
E({Um}; {V`}) ≥ inf
c>0
cv−1( c2 )− V (v−1( c2 ))
cv−1(c)− V (v−1(c)) .
Now, applying the arguments in Section V-D, we can identify
a sequence of link-cost functions V (n), n ≥ 1, such that the
corresponding sequence of efficiency bounds converges to 0
as n→∞.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper was about double auction mechanisms and a
proposal for a structured interaction to increase efficiency in
the presence of strategic agents. The mechanism has appli-
cation in data off-loading and network slicing markets. Data
offloading is a good low-cost strategy that leverages existing
auxiliary technology for handling the growth of mobile data.
Technologies to enable such offloading are now available [2],
[3]. Network slicing is expected to open up new business
opportunities for mobile operators who can slice their phys-
ical resources and lease them to tenants or virtual network
operators. Since in both examples the resulting markets are
resource trading markets, suitable compensation mechanisms
have to be put in place to encourage trading of the physical
resources. It is natural that the agents involved are strategic.
This paper demonstrates that mechanisms for trading resources
should be designed with some care. An earlier work proposed
a data offloading mechanism (collect bids, allocate offloading
amounts, and distribute payments) and designed an iterative
procedure to get the system to a competitive equilibrium where
all agents benefited, if all agents were price-taking. We showed
that if the agents are price-anticipating, this benefit completely
disappears and the efficiency loss is 100%. New mechanisms
are thus needed when all agents are price-anticipating. We
proposed a simple Stackelberg formulation with the supplying
agent as a lead player. The resulting mechanism structures
the interactions and alleviates the problem to some extent.
The efficiency is lower bounded in terms of the true link
cost function. The efficiency loss is 25% for quadratic link
costs (efficiency = 0.75). While there are link cost functions
for which the efficiency loss, even in the Stackelberg for-
mulation, is close to 100%, these appear to be pathological
cases. The proposed mechanism with link suppliers as lead
players will likely have tolerable efficiency loss for most
real link cost functions and arbitrary but linear user pay-
offs. This is to be contrasted with 100% efficiency loss for
the price-anticipating mechanism. Going beyond our scalar
bid per resource, our proposal also suggests an interesting
open problem for implementation theorists. Does the minimum
signaling dimension for social welfare maximization (in the
Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept) strictly decrease?
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof is based on Lagrangian technique. We now
outline the key steps before going into the details. We first
show that the optimality conditions for SYSTEM implies
(C1)−(C3) that are required of a competitive equilibrium
(CE); since the problem SYSTEM is convex, the existence
result simply follows from the existence of a (primal and dual
optimal) solution to the KKT conditions [15], [16]. For the
second part, starting with (C1)−(C3) we deduce the optimality
conditions for SYSTEM; the second part of the theorem then
follows since KKT conditions in our present setting are both
necessary and sufficient for optimality. Details follow.
A. Proof of Existence of CE
Step-1: KKT conditions for SYSTEM
The Lagrangian for SYSTEM in (1) is given by
L(x,y, λ,µ) =
M∑
m=1
Um(xm)− V
(
M∑
m=1
ym
)
−λ
(∑
m
ym − C
)
−
∑
m
µm
(
xm − ym
)
where, λ and µ = (µ1, · · · , µm) are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints in (1b) and (1c), respectively.
Defining y =
∑
i
yi, the optimality conditions are given by
U ′m(xm) = µm if xm > 0
U ′m(0) ≤ µm if xm = 0
}
(47)
V ′ (y) + λ = µm if ym > 0
V ′ (y) + λ ≥ µm if ym = 0
}
(48)
along with primal feasibility ((1b)−(1d)), dual feasibility (i.e.,
λ ≥ 0, µm ≥ 0 ∀m) and complementary slackness conditions:
λ
(∑
m
ym − C
)
= 0 (49)
µm
(
xm − ym
)
= 0 ∀m. (50)
Step-2: Identifying a candidate competitive-equilibrium
Since the problem is convex there exist primal and dual op-
timal points, (xs, ys) and (λs,µs), respectively, that together
satisfy the above KKT conditions. Define ps and βs as
psm = x
s
mµ
s
m (51)
βsm =
{
ysm
(µsm−λs) if µ
s
m 6= λs
0 otherwise.
(52)
In the following we will show that (ps,βs, λs,µs) is a
competitive equilibrium, i.e., we verify (C1)−(C3).
Step-3: Verifying (C1) and (C2)
To verify (C1), we need to show that psm is optimal for the
problem of maximizing Pm(pm;µsm) in (3) over pm ≥ 0, the
optimality condition for which is given by
U ′m
(
pm
µsm
)
= µsm if pm > 0
U ′m(0) ≤ µsm if pm = 0.
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From (47) and (51) it follows that psm satisfies the above
condition, thus implying (C1).
Similarly, the optimality condition for maximizing the link
pay-off function, PL
(
β; (µs, λs)
)
in (4) over β ≥ 0 is:
• if βm > 0
V ′
(∑
i
βi
(
µsi − λs
))(
µsm − λs
)
=
(
µsm − λs
)2
; (53)
• if βm = 0
V ′
(∑
i
βi
(
µsi − λs
))(
µsm − λs
)
≥
(
µsm − λs
)2
. (54)
We show that βsm in (52) satisfies the above. Suppose
βsm > 0 then it should be that µ
s
m 6= λs. Thus, with β = βs,
expression (53) simplifies to
V ′
(∑
i
βsi
(
µsi − λs
))
+ λs = µsm =: µ
s (55)
which follows from the first part of (48). On the other hand,
if βsm = 0 then either µ
s
m = λs or y
s
m = 0 (or both). If the
former is true then (54) holds trivially, while in the latter case
(54) follows from the second part of (48). Thus, condition
(C2) is verified.
Step-4: Verifying (C3)
To verify (C3-a) we need to prove that xs = ys. Evidently,
since the objective in (1a) is strictly increasing in xm (owing to
the strictly-increasing condition imposed on Um), at optimality
it should be that xs = ys. For completeness, we formally
prove this result using the optimality conditions. Suppose 0 ≤
xsm < y
s
m for some m. Then, the slackness condition in (50)
immediately implies that µsm = 0, so that from (48) we obtain
V ′(ys) + λs = 0. Since V is strictly increasing and ysm > 0,
we have V ′(ys) > 0 yielding λs < 0 which is a contradiction.
Thus, xsm = y
s
m ∀m.
Since (C2) is already verified, from (55) we see that we have
µsm = µ
s for all m ∈ Ms, where Ms = {m : µsm 6= λs}.
Thus, (summing the expression in (51) over all m) we have∑
m
xsm =
∑
m
psm
µsm
=
∑
m∈Ms
psm
µs
+
∑
m/∈Ms
psm
µsm
=
1
µs
∑
m
psm. (56)
The last equality is obtained by noting that pms = 0 for m /∈
Ms. This is because, when µsm = λs, from (48) we see that
ysm = 0 (as y
s
m > 0 leads to the contradiction V
′(ys) = 0);
now, since xsm = y
s
m (from (C3-a)) we obtain p
s
m = 0 from
(51). This establishes (56).
Similarly, using (52) and by splitting the following sum over
m ∈Ms and m /∈Ms separately, we obtain∑
m
ysm =
∑
m
βsm
(
µsm − λs
)
=
(
µs − λs
) ∑
m∈Ms
βsm. (57)
Note that, unlike in (56), the summation in the final term above
is restricted to m ∈Ms. This is because, in this case whenever
µsm 6= λs it is not necessary that βsm = 0. We need to consider
two cases:
• Suppose λs = 0. Then, since
∑
m
xm =
∑
m
ym (recall (C3-
a)), solving for µs from (56) and (57) we obtain
µs =
∑
m
psm/Ĉ
s
where Ĉs is as in (5) (but with (p,β) replaced with
(ps,βs)). Using the above in (56) yields
∑
m
xsm = Ĉ.
Since
∑
m
xsm ≤ C, we have Ĉs ≤ C under this case.
• Suppose λs > 0. Then the slackness condition in (49)
immediately implies
∑
m
ym = C =
∑
m
xm. Thus, from
(56), we have
µs =
∑
m
psm/C.
Using this in (57) and simplifying for λs we obtain
λs =
(
1−
(
C
Ĉs
)2) ∑
i
psi
C
.
Note that, since λs > 0, we have Ĉs > C in this case.
Results from the above two conditions can be compactly
expressed as (7) and (8); thus (C3-b) and (C3-c) are verified.
B. Proof of Optimality of CE
Let (pc,βc, λc,µc) be a competitive equilibrium. Define
rate-vectors xc and yc as xcm =
pcm
µcm
and ycm = β
c
m(µ
c
m − λc).
We will show that (xc, yc, λc, µc) satisfies the KKT conditions
for the problem SYSTEM (recall Step-1).
From (C1) it follows that pcm is optimal for the user problem
of maximizing the pay-off function Pm(pm;µcm) in (3) over
all pm ≥ 0. Thus we have
U ′m
(
pcm
µcm
)
= µcm if p
c
m > 0
U ′m(0) ≤ µcm if pcm = 0.
With xcm :=
pcm
µcm
the above expression is identical to the KKT
condition in (47).
Similarly, (C2) implies that βc is optimal for the link’s
problem of maximizing PL
(
β; (µc, λc)
)
in (4) over β ≥ 0.
Thus, βc satisfies the optimality conditions in (53) and (54),
but with (λs,µs) replaced by (λc,µc).
• Suppose ycm = β
c
m(µ
c
m−λc) > 0 then βcm > 0 and µcm 6=
λc; the optimality condition in this case simplifies to the
expression in (55) (but again with (βs, λs,µs) replaced
by (βc, λc,µc)). Then, substituting ycm = β
c
m(µ
c
m − λc),
we obtain the first part of the KKT condition in (48) is
satisfied.
• Suppose ycm = 0 then either µ
c
m = λ
c or βcm = 0 (or
both). µcm = λ
c case trivially satisfies the optimality
conditions in (53) and (54). If βcm = 0 then the second
part of (48) follows from (54).
For the slackness conditions in (49) and (50), note that
condition (C3-1) in (6) implies xcm = y
c
m (∀m) so that (50)
holds immediately. To show (49), first suppose that λc > 0.
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Then, from (C3-c) in (8) we have Ĉc > C (where Ĉc is as
in (5) but with (p,β) replaced by (pc,βc)). Using the above
condition in (7) of (C3-b) we obtain µ =
∑
i p
c
i/C. Thus∑
m
ycm =
∑
m
xcm =
∑
m∈M
pcm
µcm
+
∑
m/∈M
pcm
µcm
=
∑
m
pcm
µ
= C,
where we have used the fact that pcm = 0 for m /∈ M to get
the last equality. Next, suppose that
∑
m
ycm < C. In this case
we have
C >
∑
m
ycm =
∑
m
xcm =
∑
m
pcm/µ = min
{
C, Ĉc
}
implying Ĉc < C so that from (C3-c) in (8) we obtain λc = 0.
Thus, the slackness condition in (49) is verified.
Finally, since the problem SYSTEM in (1) is convex, the
sufficiency of the KKT conditions [15], [16] imply that (xc, yc)
is (primal) optimal. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION IV
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The Lagrangian for the problem NETWORK in (2) is given
by
L(x,y, λ,µ) =
∑
m
pm log(xm)−
∑
m
y2m
2βm
−λ
(∑
m
ym − C
)
−
∑
m
µm
(
xm − ym
)
where λ and µ = (µ1, · · · , µm) are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints in (2b) and (2c), respectively.
The optimality (KKT) conditions include
∂L
∂xm
=
pm
xm
− µm = 0 ∀m (58)
∂L
∂ym
= − ym
βm
− λ+ µm = 0 ∀m (59)
along with primal feasibility ((2b), (2c) and (2d)), dual feasi-
blity (λ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0), and the following complementary
slackness conditions:
λ
(∑
m
ym − C
)
= 0 (60)
µm
(
xm − ym
)
= 0 ∀m. (61)
Note that the objective in (2a) is strictly increasing with xm;
hence, at optimality it should be that xm = ym for all m. As
in the proof of Theorem 1 (see Step-4), this observation can
also be argued formally using the KKT conditions. Suppose at
optimality we have xm < ym for some m. Then, the slackness
condition in (61) implies µm = 0, using which in (59) we
obtain ym = −βmλ. However, non-negativity constraint on
all the variables forces βmλ = 0, yielding 0 ≤ xm = ym = 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus, at optimality we must have
 
 
Case-1: fp(1),β (1)(t)
Case-2: fp(2),β (2)(t)
λ(1) = 0
∑
m
√
p
(1)
m β
(1)
m
∑
m
√
p
(2)
m β
(2)
m
λ(2) = f−1
p(2),β (2)
(C )
C
t
Fig. 2. Illustration of the two cases that are possible depending on whether
fp,β(0) =
∑
m
√
pmβm ≤ C (Case-1) or otherwise (Case-2). In the
above depiction (p(1),β(1)) and (p(2),β(2)) are such that they satisfy
case-1 and case-2, respectively, so that λ(1) := λ(p(1),β(1)) = 0 and
λ(2) := λ(p(2),β(2)) = f−1
p(2),β(2)
(C).
xm = ym ∀m. Now, using (58) and (59) in the above
expression we have
xm =
pm
µm
= βm
(
µm − λ
)
= ym ∀m. (62)
Solving this for µm we obtain (as required; recall (11))
µm =
λ+
√
λ2 + 4 pmβm
2
∀m. (63)
We next proceed to obtain λ. For this, using the above
expression in (62) and summing over all m, we obtain∑
m
xm = fp,β(λ) =
∑
m
ym ≤ C, (64)
where the function fp,β is as in (10), and the inequality is sim-
ply due to the capacity constraint in (2b). Note that, fp,β(λ) as
a function of λ is strictly decreasing with fp,β(0) =
∑
i
√
piβi
(see Fig. 2 for an illustration). Also, limλ→∞ fp,β(λ) = 0.
Two cases are possible (recall (9)) as follows.
Case-1 (fp,β(0) ≤ C): In this case λ = 0 alone satisfies
(64) while ensuring the slackness condition in (60).
Case-2 (fp,β(0) > C): In this case we require λ > 0,
since λ = 0 cannot satisfy (64). However, λ > 0 immediately
implies
∑
m
ym = C (see (60)). Hence, we set λ = f−1p,β(C).
See Fig. 2 for an illustration of the above two cases. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We will first show that (po,βo) is a Nash equilibrium. For
this, note that once the link-supplier fixes his bids to βo = 0,
then for any vector of user bids p ≥ 0 the system operates in
the regime
∑
i
√
piβoi ≤ C. Thus, using the first expression in
(12), for any pm > 0, we have
Qm(pm,p
o
−m,β
o) = Um(0)− pm
< Um(0)
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= Qm(p
o
m,p
o
−m,β
o).
Thus, unilateral deviation from pom is not beneficial for user
m (∀m). Similarly, for any β such that βm > 0 for some m,
we have
QL(β,p
o) = −V (0) +
∑
m
pom = QL(β
o,po)
To obtain the above, note that since the users' payments are
zero, from (13), the first expression applies. Any other value of
βm does not strictly increase the pay-off of the link-supplier.
Thus, (po,βo) is a Nash equilibrium.
We now prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Let
(p∗,β∗) be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose p∗m > 0 for some
m. Then, if β∗m = 0 (recalling (12)) the pay-off to user m is
Qm(p
∗
m,p
∗
−m,β
∗) = Um(0)− p∗m < Um(0)
= Qm(0,p
∗
−m,β
∗)
which contradicts the assumption that (p∗,β∗) is a Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, if β∗m > 0, then the link-
supplier can benefit by deviating to the bid βo. This is because,
the rate-cost incurred by deviating to βo is always strictly
lower (since he now provides zero bandwidth). Also, the
payment
∑
m p
∗
m accrued under β
∗
m > 0 may be better if
the system was not already in the regime
∑
i
√
p∗i β
∗
i ≤ C;
if already in that regime the payment remains unchanged.
Formally,
QL(β
∗,p∗) < −V (0) +
∑
m
p∗m = QL(β
o,p∗)
which is again a contradiction. Thus, p∗m = 0 ∀m, i.e., p∗ = 0.
Now, suppose β∗m > 0 for some m. User m can benefit by
making a small payment pm. Indeed choose a pm satisfying
0 < pm ≤ min
{
C2/β∗m, qm
}
(65)
where qm is the maximizer of the function
h(pm) = Um
(√
pmβ∗m
)
− pm (66)
over pm ≥ 0. Note that h(pm) is strictly concave in pm.
Hence, qm is the unique solution to the optimality condition
U ′m
(√
qmβ∗m
)
= 2
√
qm/β∗m.
Since U ′(·) is strictly decreasing with U ′(0) > 0, we have
qm > 0, thus enabling us to choose a pm satisfying (65). The
min term in (65) involving C2/β∗m is required to ensure that
the first expression of (12) is applicable. Thus, we have
Qm(p
∗
m,p
∗
−m,β
∗) = Um(0) (since p∗m = 0)
< Um
(√
pmβ
∗
m
)
− pm
= Qm(pm,p
∗
−m,β
∗)
where the inequality is because the function h(·), being
strictly concave, is strictly increasing until qm. The above
contradiction implies that β∗m = 0 ∀m, i.e., β∗ = 0. Hence,
(po,βo) is the only Nash equilibrium. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first show that the objective function of the problem in
(18) is continuous in βm for each m. We next argue that it is
sufficient to consider argmax in (18) over a compact set of β
values. Then the proof is completed by invoking Weierstrass
theorem. The details are as follows.
Proof of continuity: To show the continuity of the objective
in (18) it suffices to prove that rβm is continuous in βm (for
all m). For simplicity we omit the subscript m hereafter. Let
us first prove right-continuity of rβ at β = 0. Clearly, since
rβ is the solution to U ′m(r) = 2r/β, we see that rβ ≥ 0
and, moreover, since U ′m is strictly decreasing we have rβ =
U ′m(rβ)
2 β ≤ U
′
m(0)
2 β from which it follows that r0 = 0 so
that rβ is continuous at β = 0. To prove continuity at any
β > 0, we show that rβ is Lipschitz continuous, i.e., |rβ1 −
rβ2 | ≤ U
′
m(0)
2 |β1 − β2|. Without loss of generality assume
β2 > β1 so that rβ2 > rβ1 . Then we have (again since U
′
m(·)
is decreasing)
rβ2 − rβ1 = U ′m(rβ2)β2/2− U ′m(rβ1)β1/2
≤ U ′m(rβ2)β2/2− U ′m(rβ2)β1/2
= (U ′m(rβ2)/2)(β2 − β1)
≤ (U ′m(0)/2)(β2 − β1).
This establishes Lipschitz continuity.
Proof that it suffices to search for βm in a bounded set:
First note that, using the definition of rβm and p
β
m, we may
write the objective function as
−V
(∑
m
pβm
rβm/βm
)
+
∑
m
pβm
= −V
(∑
m
pβm
U ′m(rβm)/2
)
+
∑
m
pβm
≤ −V
(∑
m
pβm
U ′m(0)/2
)
+
∑
m
pβm
since V (·) is strictly increasing. From the assumption that
V (x)/x → ∞ as x → ∞, we see that the last term in the
right-hand side above is less than 0 for all (pβm, 1 ≤ m ≤M)
with
∑
m p
β
m > P for some bounded P . Since each p
β
m ≥ 0,
we trivially have that 0 ≤ pβm ≤ P .
From the formula for rβm and p
β
m, we have p
β
m =
rβmU
′
m(rβm)/2, and hence 0 ≤ rβmU ′m(rβm)/2 ≤ P . Under
the assumption rU ′m(r) → ∞ as r → ∞, we must then
have 0 ≤ rβm ≤ R for some bounded R, and since U ′m
is strictly decreasing and strictly positive, we must have
U ′m(rβm) ≥ U ′m(R) > 0. Using this, we then have
βm = p
β
m/(U
′
m(rβm)/2)
2 ≤ 4P/(U ′m(R))2 <∞.
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Consider linear pay-offs of the form Um(xm) = cmxm
where cm > 0 (m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ). Without loss of generality,
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assume that c1 = maxm{cm}. Then, recalling (22), the utility
at Stackelberg equilibrium can be written as
Stackelberg utility
=
∑
m
Um
(
xβ
∗
m
)
− V
(∑
m
xβ
∗
m
)
= U1
(
v−1
(c1
2
))
− V
(
v−1
(c1
2
))
= c1v
−1
(c1
2
)
− V
(
v−1
(c1
2
))
. (67)
Next, the social optimal utility is obtained by solving
max
x≥0
{∑
m
Um (xm)− V
(∑
m
xm
)}
.
Substituting for the linear pay-off functions and rearranging,
the above problem can be alternatively expressed as
max
X≥0
{∑
m
cmxm − V
(∑
m
xm
)}
.
Thus, the optimal rate allocation xSm is given by
xSm =
{
v−1(c1) if m = 1
0 otherwise.
Thus, the social optimal utility is given by
Social utility =
∑
`
(
c1v
−1(c1)− V
(
v−1(c1)
) )
. (68)
From (67) and (68) we have (replacing c1 by c)
E({Um};V ) ≥
cv−1( c2 )− V (v−1( c2 ))
cv−1(c)− V (v−1(c)) .
The worst case bound on efficiency can be obtained by taking
infimum over all c > 0. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
The proof of the first part, that (Po,Ao) is an ML Nash
equilibrium, is identical to the proof of the corresponding part
in Theorem 2. The uniqueness part however requires some
modifications since the user pay-offs are now functions of its
payments-to and signals-from all the links.
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we begin by assuming that
(P∗,B∗) is an ML Nash equilibrium. Suppose that p∗m` > 0
for some (m, `). For simplicity define
δm` =

√
p∗m`β
∗
m` if
∑
i
√
p∗i`β
∗
i` ≤ C`
2p∗m`
λ∗`+
√
λ∗`
2+4
p∗
m`
β∗
m`
otherwise
where λ∗` = λ`(P
∗,B∗). If β∗m` = 0, then δm` = 0 and we
can write
Qm(p∗m,p
∗
−m,B
∗) = Um
∑
j
δmj
−∑
j
p∗mj
= Um
∑
j 6=`
δmj
−∑
j
p∗mj
< Um
∑
j 6=`
δmj
−∑
j 6=`
p∗mj
= Qm(pm,p
∗
−m,B
∗)
where pm is such that pm` = 0 while pmj = p∗mj ∀j 6= `.
The above is a contradiction to our assumption that (P∗,B∗)
is an ML Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if β∗m` > 0,
we have
QL,`(β
∗
` ,β
∗
−`,P
∗) < −V`(0) +
∑
m
p∗m`
= QL,`(β
o
` ,β
∗
−`,P
∗)
a contradiction. Hence, p∗m` = 0 ∀(m, `), i.e., P∗ = 0.
Now, suppose β∗m` > 0 for some (m, `). Then, as in the
proof of Theorem 2, we have
Qm(p∗m,p
∗
−m,B
∗) = Um(0) (since p∗m = 0)
< Um
(√
pm`β
∗
m`
)
− pm`
= Qm(pm,p
∗
−m,B
∗)
where pm is such that pmj = p∗mj ∀` 6= j and pm` satisfies
0 < pm` ≤ min
{
C2` /β
∗
m`, qm
}
where qm is the maximizer of the function h(·) in (66). Thus,
β∗m` = 0 ∀(m, `) (i.e., B∗ = 0) for a Nash equilibrium. This
completes the proof. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
The proof is along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4. For
completeness we however present the details again here.
Consider linear pay-offs of the form Um(xm) = cmxm
where cm > 0 (m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ). Without loss of generality,
assume that c1 = maxm{cm}. Then, recalling (42) and (44),
the utility at Stackelberg equilibrium can be written as
Stackelberg utility
=
∑
m
Um
(∑
`
xB
∗
m`
)
−
∑
`
V`
(∑
m
xB
∗
m`
)
= U1
(∑
`
v−1`
(c1
2
))
−
∑
`
V`
(
v−1`
(c1
2
))
= c1
∑
`
v−1`
(c1
2
)
−
∑
`
V`
(
v−1`
(c1
2
))
=
∑
`
(
c1v
−1
`
(c1
2
)
− V`
(
v−1`
(c1
2
)))
. (69)
Next, the social optimal utility is obtained by solving
max
X≥0
{∑
m
Um
(∑
`
xm`
)
−
∑
`
V`
(∑
m
ym`
)}
.
Substituting for the linear pay-off functions and rearranging,
the above problem can be alternatively expressed as
max
X≥0
{∑
`
(∑
m
cmxm` − V`
(∑
m
xm`
))}
.
17
Thus, for each ` the optimal rate allocation xSm` is given by
xSm` =
{
v−1` (a1) if m = 1
0 otherwise.
Thus, the social optimal utility is given by
Social utility =
∑
`
(
c1v
−1
` (c1)− V`
(
v−1` (c1)
) )
. (70)
From (69) and (70) we have (replacing c1 by c)
E({Um}; {V`}) ≥
∑
`
(
cv−1` (
c
2 )− V`(v−1` ( c2 ))
)
∑
`
(
cv−1` (c)− V`(v−1` (c))
) .
The worst case bound on efficiency can be obtained by taking
infimum over all c > 0. 
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